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CASENOTES
Greene v. City of Memphis: Is Intent the
Sine Qua Non of Discrimination Claims?
Seemingly routine actions taken by our nation's cities and
states, exercising their police power, increasingly face charges
of racial discrimination. This casenote provides an historical
perspective for, and an analysis of, a recent case currently on
appeal before the United States Supreme Court. The author
highlights the problems surrounding the various tests used to
determine whether state action does in fact discriminate
against a particular class or group of people.
Residents of the all-white Hein Park subdivision of Memphis,
Tennessee, obtained the city's approval to close West Drive, a
thoroughfare that ran through Hein Park. This action afforded
them the privacy and safety of living on a dead-end street. Local
residents, including residents of a large, predominantly black
neighborhood just beyond West Drive's merger with another street,
had customarily used West Drive for crosstown access. After the
city's action, various residents and property owners of the affected
black neighborhood initiated a class action suit against the city of
Memphis and its officials who had approved the closing. The suit
alleged that the defendants had designed the street closing deliber-
ately to isolate Hein Park from the blacks and that this action lim-
ited access to the black area so severely that it reduced the blacks'
property values. The plaintiffs claimed that the closing violated
their rights under the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, and
sought relief under title 42 of the United States Code, sections
1982 and 1983.1
1. The thirteenth amendment, section 1, provides: "Neither slavery nor involuntary ser-
vitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CoNsT.
amend. XIII, § 1.
The fourteenth amendment, section 1, provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the ju-
risdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
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The United States District Court for the Western District of
Tennessee dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.'
The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit, which reversed the dismissal and remanded,
holding that the plaintiffs properly stated a claim and that on re-
mand plaintiffs would have to prove that the city's action was ra-
cially motivated, absent a showing of egregious differential treat-
ment (Greene 1).3 On remand, the district court ruled for the
defendants because the differential treatment was mot so "stark"
that one could infer a discriminatory motive. Once again, the black
residents sought review in the court of appeals. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held, reversed and re-
manded: The closing of a city street that disproportionately and
adversely affects local blacks through inconvenience and reduction
in their property values violates the thirteenth amendment as a
"badge of slavery," justifying relief under section 1982, even with-
out a showing of racial motives. Greene v. City of Memphis, 610
F.2d 395 (6th Cir. 1979) (Greene II).
For almost a century the United States Supreme Court has
wrestled vigorously with the question whether racial discrimination
claims require a showing of intent or motive to discriminate, and,
if so, by what standard a court should determine the presence and
effect of intent.' The Supreme Court created a milestone in the
review of racial discrimination in Korematsu v. United States,5 in
which the Court developed a methodology for viewing discrimina-
tion claims under the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976) provides: "All citizens of the United States shall have the same
right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citi-
zen of the United States or other person within the jursidiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
2. Greene v. City of Memphis, No. 75-1339 (W.D. Tenn. 1975).
3. Greene v. City of Memphis, 535 F.2d 976, 977 (6th. Cir. 1979) (Greene I).
4. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S.
52 (1964); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935);
Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
5. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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clause.' Under this methodology, classifications that discriminate
racially are "suspect" factors, which the courts will examine very
closely. This close review, or "strict scrutiny," requires a chal-
lenged government to prove that a compelling state interest justi-
fies the disputed classification. Additionally, courts will strictly
scrutinize any state action that infringes on a recognized funda-
mental right.' If the challenged action involves neither a suspect
class nor a violation of a fundamental right, a court will conduct a
less intense review: the action need only be rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.10
This Court-developed review raises two basic questions. The
first is whether the case involves a fundamental right or suspect
class. For this purpose, the Court has identified rights that are fun-
damental and classes that are suspect.11 When a case, such as
Greene II, involves alleged discrimination against a suspect class,
the second basic question is what test is appropriate for deciding
whether a government's action has discriminated in violation of
equal protection, and thus whether strict scrutiny is the proper
standard of review. The court of appeals in Greene II found this
question very troublesome.12
Several contradictory decisions on discrimination followed
Korematsu, and in these cases the Supreme Court never clearly
determined which factor should trigger strict scrutiny of allegedly
discriminatory state actions: the racially disproportionate impact
of the action, or proof of the governmental unit's intent to discrim-
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The due process clause of the fifth amendment also
implies an equal protection element. Id. amend. V. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 239 (1976) (citing Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)).
7. The term "suspect" originated in Justice Black's majority opinion in Korematsu, 323
U.S. at 216.
8. In this more intense two-prong approach, the government must show a compelling
interest and prove that it could not have taken alternative action that would have an
equally effective result but a less discriminatory impact. Id. at 214.
9. See generally Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). But see generally Gunther,
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protec-
tion, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972).
10. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
11. For example, in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court categorized as sus-
pect any classifications that relate to race, but the Court refused to categorize as suspect any
classification based on wealth, in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973). Furthermore, the Court has held fundamental such rights as travel, Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), but has declined to do so for activities such as receiving
welfare benefits, Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972). ,
12. 610 F.2d at 401. For another view of the issue, see Judge Celebrezze's dissent, main-
taining that section 1982 review requires the same showing of discriminatory intent as do
claims based directly on the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 408.
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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
inate-or both."3 By not firmly establishing a clear approach for
reviewing claims, the Court left the lower courts without guidance
and fostered controversial decisions such as Greene II." This ab-
sence of direction led to further argument against judicial review of
government actions even when these actions were based on appar-
ently benevolent motives.15
The unclear language of the court opinions in discrimination
cases evidenced and heightened the confusion. One example is the
use of the terms "disproportionate impact" and "uneven impact."
These phrases describe the consequences of a state action that
places one class of people at a disadvantage to another-in effect,
preferring one class over another. Uneven impact occurs when gov-
ernment action conferring or denying benefits produces better re-
sults for one class than for another. Disproportionate impact oc-
curs when action infringes more economically on one class than on
others, or from the uneven distribution of benefits among classes.1 6
The difficulty in understanding such concepts and their distinc-
tions created chaos among the lower courts. Furthermore, the lan-
guage of equal protection uses the terms "purpose" and "intent"
interchangeably to describe the results that "the decisionmakers
desire to achieve by the operation of their decision."
1 7
In Palmer v. Thompson, 8 the Supreme Court stated that in
reviewing racial discrimination claims the Justices would not con-
sider the intent behind governmental action.19 In Palmer, blacks in
13. The Court has used various approaches to examine state action, including inquiries
that focus on the state's motive and the action's impact, singularly or in combination, Board
of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (developing a "purpose" or "primary effect" test
under the establishment clause of the first amendment); on improper motives, using the
action's impact only to judge motive, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (redesign-
ing municipal boundaries); or on the action's impact, disregarding the state's motives,
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971) (closing municipal swimming pools after
court ordered racial integration).
14. See Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 36, 39 (1977).
15. The majority opinions in both Greene II, 610 F.2d at 402, and Palmer, 403 U.S. at
224-25, indicate a sensitivity to these arguments. See Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 114-15.
16. See Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 40-41.
17. Id. at 41 (quoting Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of
Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REv. 95, 101).
18. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
19. Id. at 224-25. The Court stated that such a focus would be inherently impractical
and ultimately futile. The majority opinion ostensibly distinguished Griffin v. County
School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964), and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), on the
ground that the focus in those cases was on the effect, not the motive, of the actions. Id. at
225; see notes 23-25 and accompanying text infra. Justice White's dissent concluded that
the evidence pointed to a clear racial motive behind the closing. 403 U.S. 246-54.
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Jackson, Mississippi, fought to desegregate the city's public swim-
ming pools and won in the district court.20 The city, however, then
closed most of the pools and leased the remainder to a private
party who prohibited use by blacks. The blacks challenged the ac-
tion under the equal protection clause, alleging that the city closed
the pools solely to avoid integration.2 The Court, however, refused
to find the city's motives a determinative factor of discrimination
and held that Jackson had no obligation to keep the pools open,
especially since the closings affected blacks and whites equally.22.
Although the Palmer Court was clear in finding motive an ir-
relevant factor, other racial discrimination cases decided by the
Court have implied that motive or intent played a major role in
the outcome of the decision. Eleven years before Palmer, in Gomil-
lion v. Lightfoot,' plaintiffs alleged that the Alabama Legislature
had redesigned the city limits of Tuskegee from a square to an
"uncouth" twenty-eight-sided figure.' This act displaced virtually
all of the town's black voters from the municipality, although it
excluded no whites. The Court held that this gerrymandering of
the city limits discriminated unconstitutionally; 5 but the holding
implied that the motive or intent behind the governmental action
was relevant. The Court found that, given the uncontradicted alle-
gations of the complaint, the conclusion was "irresistible . . . that
the legislation [was] solely concerned with segregating white and
colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out of town so as to de-
prive them of their pre-existing municipal vote.'2 The Court also
stated that "[a]cts generally lawful may become unlawful when
done to accomplish an unlawful end, . . . and a constitutional
power cannot be used by way of condition to attain an unconstitu-
tional result.'
7
Four years after Gomillion, in Griffin v. County School
20. Clark v. Thompson, 206 F. Supp. 539 (S.D. Miss.), aff'd per curiam, 313 F.2d 637
(5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
21. The mayor of Jackson allegedly had made public statements that "we are not going
to have any intermingling," had called the blacks "agitators," and had expressed his inten-
tion to maintain segregation. 403 U.S. at 250 (White, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at '220, 224-25.
23. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
24. Id. at 340.
25. Id. at 347. The government argued that its police powers made the action lawful.
Id.
26. Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 347-48 (quoting Western Union Tel. Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105, 114 (1918)
(citation omitted). In Palmer, the Court admitted that its language in Gomillion suggested
the relevancy of motive in determining a law's constitutionality. 403 U.S. at 225.
1980]
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Board,28 the Court relied expressly on governmental motive and
ordered a county government to re-open public schools that it had
closed for the alleged purpose of preventing desegregation.2 9 The
Court compared the Virginia law, challenged in Griffin, to a similar
Louisiana law struck down three years earlier by a district court.
The Court found that the intent behind both laws, and not their
impact, was the key factor: Although "the Louisiana plan and the
Virginia plan worked in different ways, it is plain that both were
created to accomplish the same thing: the perpetuation of racial
segregation by closing public schools . . . . "
Curiously, in Palmer, decided seven years after Griffin, the
Court said that the effect of the action on blacks, and not the mo-
tive behind the action, determined the outcome of Griffin."1 This
contradictory statement added to the confusion about the role of
legislative intent in discrimination claims. The language and result
in Griffin are inconsistent with the language and result in Palmer,
although in both cases a government closed public facilities to pre-
vent desegration.82 Likewise, the majority opinion in Palmer at-
tempted to obviate its inconsistency with Gomillion by explaining
that the Court based its decision in Gomillion not upon the city's
motives in redistricting but rather, as in Griffin, upon the adverse
impact on blacks.8
A significant clarification of the role of impact and motive in
the Court's scrutiny of state action came in 1976, in Washington v.
Davis." Davis represented a critical deviation from Palmer's reli-
ance on a "pure impact" test. In Davis, the Court announced an
"impact-plus" test for determining whether an action discrimi-
nates racially. 5 Under this test, a court strictly scrutinizes state
action that has a disproportionate racial impact only if the plaintiff
has shown that the action involves a discriminatory intent or mo-
tive.8 In Davis, blacks who had failed written tests for employ-
28. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
29. Id. at 232.
30. Id.
31. 403 U.S. at 225.
32. The actions, however, were not identical. In Griffin, the county had closed its public
schools and provided tuition grants to students enrolled in segregated private schools. The
closing in Palmer, on the other hand, denied the use of the swimming pools to blacks and
whites equally. This distinction may in part explain the difference in the results.
33. 403 U.S. at 225.
34. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
35. Id. at 238-48.
36. Five years before Davis, a unanimous Court held that a plaintiff claiming dispro-
portionate impact need not prove the presence of discriminatory motive. Griggs v. Duke
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ment as police officers in Washington, D.C., alleged that the tests
violated the equal protection clause. They presented evidence that
blacks failed four times more frequently than whites. The Court
refused to invalidate the police test merely because of its dispro-
portionate impact.3 7 Departing from its earlier pure-impact test,
the Court based its rationale for an "impact-plus" standard On two
concerns. First, it feared that a pure-impact test would lead to the
judicial veto of legitimate government actions:
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nev-
ertheless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it
benefits or burdens one race more than another would be far
reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps
invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regula-
tory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the
poor and to the average black than to the more affluent white."
Second, the Court stressed that judicial review of legitimate politi-
cal actions of government might become uncontrollable if dispro-
portionate impact were the limit of the inquiry. 9 The Court in Da-
vis added more confusion to the controversy surrounding the role
of motive by restricting the Palmer holding to the elimination of
motive only from an analysis of the legitimate reasons behind the
pool closings in Palmer.40 The Court also stated that it had not
intended in Palmer to make the question of motive totally irrele-
vant in racial discrimination cases.41
Shortly after Davis, in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Housing Development Corp.,"2 the Court reaffirmed its
holding in Davis requiring a showing of discriminatory motive.43 In
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (blacks challenging a utility company's educational re-
quirements for employment or promotion). The cause of action in Griggs, however, was
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which Congress passed to prevent discrimi-
nation in employment. The Court in Davis decided that the Griggs-Title VII standard was
not required by the Constitution, 426 U.S. at 239. Furthermore, the Court treated the Davis
case according to standards already developed, since Title VII did not apply to the District
of Columbia's employees when the Davis plaintiffs initiated their complaint. Id. at 238-41.
See also Note, 1977 DuKE L.J. 1267.
37. 426 U.S. at 240, 242.
38. 426 U.S. at 248 (footnote omitted). Judge Celebrezze's dissenting opinion in Greene
II also relied on this rationale to support the validity of the street closing. See 610 F.2d at
408-09.
39. 426 U.S. at 247; see Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrim-
ination, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 540, 547-49 (1977).
40. 426 U.S. at 243.
41. Id. at 244 n.11.
42. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
43. Id. at 265-66. In Arlington Heights, the plaintiffs based their discrimination claim
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Arlington Heights, the Court upheld a town's refusal to rezone a
predominantly white area to permit building low- and moderate-
income housing, despite the action's disproportionately adverse
impact on minorities hoping to live there. The Court cited the lack
of any proven intent." Moreover, the Court provided a non-ex-
haustive list of factors for use in determining whether motive can
be inferred: (1) disproportionate impact;4 5 (2) historical back-
ground of the government action, especially if it reveals invidious
motives;"6 (3) events leading toward the action, particularly any
departures from normal procedures;47 and (4) the legislative record
and testimony of the officials devising or implementing the
action.
4 8
In Arlington Heights, the Court took a stand fully consistent
with its position in Griffin on the relevance of intent.49 In these
cases, the Court apparently relied on an intent standard when the
intent behind the government action was clearly discriminatory,
while retreating to a pure-impact standard in cases in which intent
was not obvious.5 0 Another force behind the case development,
suggested by some authors, is the fear of the pure-impact standard,
hastening the Court's adoption of the impact-plus test.51
on the equal protection clause and the Civil Rights Act of 1968, since the rezoning refusal
allegedly promoted racial segregation of the neighborhood.
44. The Court required the plaintiffs to show that intent to discriminate was at least a
motive behind the government's action. Such proof shifts to the challenged government the
"burden of establishing that the same decision would have resulted even had the impermis-
sible purpose not been considered." 429 U.S. at 270 n.21.
45. Id. at 266. The Court also decided that the determination of discriminatory intent
begins with a "sensitive inquiry" into whatever evidence of intent is available. The action's
impact is only a "starting point," and except for impact as stark as that in Gomillion, im-
pact alone is not determinative. Id.
46. Id. at 267.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 268.
49. Just recently, the Court affirmed the intent requirement of Davis and Arlington
Heights in another equal protection case, Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979)
(using an impact-plus test to uphold a state's veterans' preference statute despite dispropor-
tionate impact on the sexes). In Feeney, the Court provided its definition of "intent" in
motive analysis:
"Discriminatory purpose," however, implies more than intent as volition or
intent as awareness of consequences . . . . It implies that the decisionmaker, in
this case a state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at
least in part "because of," not merely "in spite of," its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group.
Id. at 279 (citations and footnote omitted).
50. This inconsistency is most evident in the results in Griffin, Davis, and Arlington
Heights. See also Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 137.
51. 610 F.2d at 405. See also Schwemm, From Washington to Arlington Heights and
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Greene II is significant because the court of appeals con-
fronted two very important issues that the Supreme Court will
soon consider. The first is whether the intent required for claims
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
should be extended to claims under the thirteenth amendment and
42 U.S.C. sections 1982 and 1983.5" The second issue, if the Court
does require a finding of intent, is whether a reviewing court
should apply a pure-impact test or an impact-plus test.
In Greene II, the plaintiffs' claim arose under sections 1982
and 1983; the court of appeals ordered relief under section 198258
without expressly finding an intent to discriminate."5 The Supreme
Court has not yet addressed directly the issue whether intent to
discriminate is a required element under a section 1982 claim. In
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,55 the Court traced the origin of sec-
tion 1982 to section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866," which Con-
gress based on the thirteenth amendment and, to some extent, the
fourteenth amendment. 7 As the Court noted, "some members of
Congress supported the Fourteenth Amendment 'in order to elimi-
nate doubt as to the constitutional validity of the Civil Rights Act
as applied to the States.' , In Jones, cited by Judge Celebrezze's
dissent in Greene II," the Court interpreted the purpose behind
section 1 as being "to prohibit all racially motivated deprivations
of the rights enumerated in the statute."' 0 This legislative history
suggests that, for claims brought under section 1982 and the -thir-
teenth amendment, the Court will require proof of a racially dis-
criminatory intent; this requirement would parallel the standard
used for equal protection claims under the fourteenth amend-
ment."1 This approach is further suggested by the language of
Beyond: Discriminatory Purpose in Equal Protection Litigation, 1977 U. ILL. L. F. 961, 992.
52. 610 F.2d at 404 n.13.
53. Id. at 405. The court, however, did not decide whether relief could be granted di-
rectly under the thirteenth amendment and § 1983. Id. at 402 n.8.
54. The closest the court came to a consideration of intent was its statement that the
closing "appears to have been a unique step to protect one neighborhood from outside influ-
ences which the residents considered to be 'undesirable.'" Id. at 404.
55. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
56. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1976)).
57. 392 U.S. at 429-37.
58. Id. at 436 (quoting Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 32-33 (1948)).
59. 610 F.2d at 408.
60. Id. (quoting 392 U.S. at 426) (emphasis added by Celebrezze, J.).
61. Id.
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Runyon v. McCrary, 2 in which the Court found a violation of sec-
tion 1981" solely because of a private school's discriminatory mo-
tive and practice in refusing admission to blacks:
Just as in Jones a Negro's § 1 [of the Civil Rights Act of 1866]
right to purchase property on equal terms with whites was vio-
lated when a private person refused to sell to the prospective
purchaser solely because he was a Negro, so also a Negro's § 1
right to "make and enforce contracts" is violated if a private
offeror refuses to extend to a Negro, solely because he is a Ne-
gro, the same opportunity to enter into contracts as he extends
to white offerees."
The Court in Runyon noted that section 1981, like 1982, originated
from section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866."
The Greene II court, however, expressly left open the question
whether proof of intent or motive is ever required in a successful
claim under section 1982." The court cited Justice Powell's dissent
in the recent decision of County of Los Angeles v. Davis,67 in
which he suggested that the question of intent under section 1981,
a provision related to section 1982, remains unresolved.8
The Greene II court's avoidance of the intent issue departs
from the standard announced in Arlington. Heights. Moreover,
Green II contrasts sharply with the position it took, and the stan-
dard it developed, in Greene I:
To establish a section 1982 or 1983 claim on remand,
Greene must prove his allegations that city officials conferred
the closed street on West Drive residents because of their color;
he must prove racial motivation, intent, or purpose, in the ab-
sence of such egregious differential treatment as to in itself vio-
late equal protection or, alternatively, to command an inference
of racial motivation.ss
62. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides in part that "[aill persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall have the same right in every State. . .to make and enforce contracts
...as is enjoyed by white citizens ......
64. 427 U.S. at 170-71 (footnote omitted). See also Note, supra note 36, at 1280-84.
65. 427 U.S. at 168-70. The Court dismissed as a clerical mistake a historical note at-
tached to section 1981 that indicated section 1981 originated in section 16 of the Enforce-
ment Act of 1870, id. at 168 n.8. The Court has interpreted sections 1981 and 1982 on a
parallel basis. Id. at 190 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also 392 U.S. at 441 n.78.
66. 610 F.2d at 404 n.13.
67. 440 U.S. 625 (1979).
68. 610 F.2d at 404 n.13.
69. 535 F.2d at 979 (emphasis added).
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This language could fairly have been read to establish the follow-
ing standards of proof of intent required for racial discrimination
claims under sections 1982 or 1983: (1) When no egregious differ-
ential treatment exists, plaintiff must affirmatively prove defen-
dant's intent to discriminate racially; (2) when egregious differen-
tial treatment does exist, the Court will raise a) a conclusive
presumption of racial intent, when there can exist no grounds,
other than race, to justify such differential treatment; or b) a re-
buttable presumption of racial intent, when there does exist, and
defendant proves, some ground other than race to justify such dif-
ferential treatment.
Whether by affirmative showing or by presumption, each of
these situations at least implies the presence of intent to discrimi-
nate. The majority opinion in Greene II, however, labeled this os-
tensible requirement mere "dicta."70 The court held that the dis-
proportionate impact of the street closing on the blacks, without
more, was so "stark" as to violate the thirteenth amendment. The
court did not mention intent; it merely stated that the district
court, on remand, had read too stringently the Arlington Heights
and Greene I standards.7
This sharp retreat from the intent requirement arguably not
only frustrates the standard set forth in Greene I, but nullifies the
very objective sought by the Supreme Court in Arlington Heights:
the reviewing court must conduct a "sensitive inquiry" into the
"circumstantial and direct evidence of intent," with disproportion-
ate impact providing only "an important starting point."7' Justice
Powell's majority opinion in Arlington Heights concluded that this
evidentiary inquiry is relatively easy when "a clear pattern, unex-
plainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of
the state action even when the governing legislation appears neu-
tral on its face."'78 The Court stated that cases of such stark dis-
crimination are "rare" and cited Gomillion's gerrymandering as an
70. 610 F.2d at 400.
71. Id. at 401, 402.
72. 429 U.S. at 266. In Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), the Court elab-
orated on the Arlington Heights inquiry, describing it as two-fold. First is the determination
of whether the government's action is facially neutral. If so, the second step is to determine
whether the adverse impact reflects invidious discrimination. In this second step, impact
provides an important starting point, but "purposeful discrimination is 'the condition that
offends the Constitution."' Id. at 274 (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)). See generally 34 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 343 (1980).
73. 429 U.S. at 266.
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example. 4 Drastically widening what the Court in Arlington
Heights had called a "rare exception," the court in Greene II al-
lowed itself to begin and end its "inquiry" by equating the invidi-
ousness of the street closing to the action in Gomillion.7" Perhaps
the Greene II court felt that such a finding would allow it to avoid
addressing the intent issue.
Even in a case such as Gomillion, however, a court must con-
duct some inquiry into intent to determine whether any grounds
do exist to explain the differential treatment involved. 7" The court
in Greene II gave cursory attention, at best, to the legitimate rea-
sons advanced by the city in support of the closing 7 -a factor that
the Court in Arlington Heights considered very important.7 8 A rea-
sonable interpretation of both the Greene I and the Arlington
Heights standards would require a finding of intent, whether by
way of affirmative proof, rebuttable presumption, or conclusive
presumption.
In Greene II the district court's majority relied on a pure-im-
pact test, purporting to follow the standard (but avoiding the true
objective) of Arlington Heights. Judge Celebrezze, in dissent, rea-
soned that pure-impact inquiries might stifle legitimate govern-
ment action and that, by definition, "a street closing will not result
in an identical impact upon residents and nonresidents. ' ' 7 He also
recognized that the judiciary must accord a certain amount of def-
erence to legislative action involving land use regulation, especially
when racial motive is facially absent; the judge agreed with the
conclusion of the trial court that the closing discriminated on the
basis of residency, not race. 0 The majority criticized this inquiry
for its narrow scope; the court had examined the history of other
street closings in Memphis, which revealed only that no blacks had
ever been denied permission to close their neighborhood (because
no blacks in Memphis had ever attempted to do so).81 The major-
ity's inquiry seems narrow as well, in refusing to consider seriously
not only the general historical background of the action, but also
the city's legitimate motives behind the closing.
The decision in Greene II typifies the problems that a lower
74. Id..
75. 610 F.2d at 402.
76. 429 U.S. at 266.
77. 610 F.2d at 402-03.
78. 429 U.S. at 265-68.
79. 610 F.2d at 407; accord, 429 U.S. at 266 n.15.
80. 610 F.2d at 408.
81. Id. at 400.
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court confronts when determining the validity of racial discrimina-
tion claims.82 The problems arise primarily because of the Supreme
Court's failure to clarify the role of intent in determining when
impermissible discrimination occurs, and to specify in adequate
detail a standard test for identifying when racial motives exist, es-
pecially in cases of facially neutral government action. That
Greene II illustrates these problems better than it resolves them is
not surprising. The Supreme Court cases on this subject confuse
and contradict each other; they leave the courts without an appro-
priate standard for determining violations of section 1982, and, in
particular, for determining if and when intent is a requisite ele-
ment under a section 1982 violation.
The primary issue before the Supreme Court in reviewing
Greene II will be whether a city exercising its police powers to
close a street for purportedly legitimate purposes has, without
proof of any racial motive, violated section 1982 and the thirteenth
amendment. In view of its past decisions, the Supreme Court will
probably conclude that discriminatory intent is a requisite element
for relief under section 1982 claims. This holding would be consis-
tent with similar claims under the equal protection clause. The
Court will probably adopt an impact-plus test, similar to those of
Davis and Arlington Heights, to aid the courts in determining the
presence of discriminatory intent. If the Court does so-and it
should-it will probably base its rationale on an apparent and jus-
tified aversion to a pure-impact test.
Thus, the pure-impact test should be merely the starting point
for deciding claims under section 1982 and the thirteenth amend-
ment. This would provide maximum protection for the legitimate
exercise of state governmental power, as well as a clear and practi-
cal standard to guide future decisions on claims of racial
discrimination.
ERIc BUERMANN
82. The line of cases including Davis fell short of resolving what standard the courts
should use in reviewing discrimination claims under section 1982. See Comment, 1978
B.Y.U. L. REv. 1030, 1040.
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